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Abstract Does a competitive equilibrium in a matching market provide adequate
incentives for investments made before the market when utility is not perfectly trans-
ferable? In a one-sided market with a continuum of agents and finite types there is a
constrained surplus efficient equilibrium, when a social planner can only affect invest-
ments but not payoffs nor matches, if an equal treatment property holds in equilibrium.
Sufficient (but not full) utility transferability in a well defined sense implies this prop-
erty. Ex post efficiency of payoffs (i.e., individual payoffs maximize the surplus in
each match) alone is not sufficient to ensure that equilibrium investments maximize
aggregate surplus.
Keywords Matching · Assignment models · Investments · Nontransferable utility ·
Graph theory
JEL Classification C78 · D20 · D62
1 Introduction
Do equilibrium allocations and payoffs in matching markets provide adequate incen-
tives for investments in attributes that are relevant to matching partners and are made
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before the market? This is a relevant question, in particular for policy discussion
concerning education acquisition and labor markets. For instance, there appear to be
widespread concerns that—possibly because of asymmetric information (see Bénabou
and Tirole (forthcoming))—salaries in the labor market may not adequately reflect
the social marginal benefit of employees’ productivity or human capital, distorting
incentives for education investment. Similarly, when admission to good schools and
colleges, and thus access to high quality peers in the classroom, is based partly on par-
ents’ income through user fees or house prices in the presence of borrowing constraints,
rewards to prior effort in education acquisition or early childhood investments will be
distorted.
The question has attracted considerable attention in the literature. Cole et al. (2001b)
show that surplus efficient investments are in the equilibrium set when utility is per-
fectly transferable.1 At the other extreme, for strictly nontransferable utility, such that
surplus has to be split equally among partners, Peters and Siow (2002) establish Pareto
(though not necessarily surplus) efficiency of investments in a two-sided matching
market. Bhaskar and Hopkins (2014) point out the limits of this result, and Gall et al.
(2006) provide an example of surplus inefficient investments in a one-sided market
when utility is less than perfectly transferable and distorts the matching pattern. Gall
et al. (2009) find investment distortions in form of simultaneous over-investment at
the top and under-investment at the bottom, and analyze rematching policies. Mailath
et al. (2013) examine the relation of the dimensionality of the price system and poten-
tial investment distortions in a two-sided market. This raises the question of the degree
of utility transferability required to ensure that investments maximize aggregate sur-
plus. Evaluating allocations in terms of surplus efficiency appears reasonable from a
normative, ex ante perspective (in the sense of Harsanyi 1953), and from a positive
point of view when surplus relates to output.
In essence, nontransferable utility may distort ex ante investments away from the
surplus maximizing allocation through two possible channels. First, payoff distor-
tions may cause the equilibrium assignment to differ from the first best. That is, given
equilibrium investments and payoffs there may be another assignment that is not nec-
essarily stable but generates higher aggregate surplus, which may affect incentives.
Second, given an equilibrium assignment nontransferabilities may cause the equi-
librium payoffs to not adequately reflect the externalities that an agent’s investment
generates on potential matches. This paper shall be concerned with the second channel
only; analyzing surplus efficiency of the matching pattern and possible remedies is
done elsewhere (Gall et al. 2009).
One obvious way in which nontransferable utility may affect equilibrium payoffs is
in that they may not maximize joint surplus in each match formed in equilibrium. That
is, ex post efficiency of surplus may fail in that given an equilibrium assignment and
investments, in somematches a different surplus division would increase joint surplus.
This implies, of course, that also the associated equilibrium investment incentives are
distorted away from a surplus efficient allocation that maximizes aggregate surplus by
choosing investments and surplus distribution in matches.
1 This is approximately true in finite economies (Cole et al. 2001a; Felli and Roberts 2002).
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As fully transferable utility ensures that payoffs are ex post efficient and an equi-
librium allocation maximizes aggregate surplus (see Cole et al. 2001b among others),
the first observation in this paper is perhaps a little surprising: ex post efficiency of
equilibrium payoffs does not guarantee a surplus efficient allocation. The reason for
this is that with nontransferabilities ex post efficiency leaves open the possibility that
two agents with the same attribute receive strictly different equilibrium payoffs ex
post. Hence, the expected remuneration of this attribute at the investment stage (a
convex combination of different payoffs) generally will not coincide with the social
marginal contribution of this attribute (which is precisely the extra surplus generated
in the match that an extra agent with the attribute will be assigned to, when all other
agents obtain their equilibrium payoffs).
If, however, in equilibrium all agents with the same attribute receive the same pay-
off ex post, ex post efficiency guarantees that each attribute is remunerated with the
social marginal surplus generated by having one more agent with that attribute. That
is, when an equal treatment of equal attributes property holds, ex post efficiency of
equilibrium payoffs implies that an equilibrium allocation is surplus efficient condi-
tional on the equilibrium assignment. Since the surplus efficient allocation is also an
investment cum matching equilibrium allocation this means that some equilibrium
allocation is surplus efficient, absent coordination failures. One example are matching
models where surplus has to be shared equally among partners and joint surplus is
a strictly monotone function of attributes: the unique matching equilibrium has only
homogeneous matches. Splitting the surplus is ex post efficient and satisfies the equal
treatment property, so that these matching markets will generally have an investment
and matching equilibrium that is surplus efficient.2
When equilibrium payoffs are not ex post efficient, the equal treatment propertywill
still ensure that each attribute is remunerated commensuratewith itsmarginal contribu-
tion to social surplus, albeit in terms of the payoffs constrained by nontransferabilities.
Hence, the equal treatment property implies that an investment cummatching equilib-
riumwill be constrained surplus efficient, i.e., constrained to the payoffs achievable in
equilibrium given the nontransferabilities. This means a social planner who can adjust
investments, but not the sharing of surplus, could not increase aggregate surplus given
the matching. This result is particularly interesting in light of policies of rematching
individuals, such as affirmative action, suggesting the resulting equilibriumwill induce
constrained efficient investment incentives.
The equal treatment property of equilibrium payoffs, which is key to the welfare
properties, can be tied to the primitives: a sufficient condition for equal treatment is
marginally transferable utility (MTU): partners in any match can transfer utility to
each other at a bounded, strictly positive rate in each possible match of attributes.
The results are derived in a model of ex ante investments, made before a one-sided
matching market with a continuum of agents. Costly investment determines the prob-
ability distribution over possible attributes an agent may attain. After attributes have
realized agents enter the market, match into pairs, and jointly generate surplus, which
depends on attributes. A matching equilibrium is a stable match with side payments,
2 This extends to two-sided models when both market sides have the same type distribution as in the
example of Peters and Siow (2002).
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and equilibrium investments are optimal anticipating the matching equilibrium pay-
offs. Side payments are subject to nontransferabilities, captured by the Pareto frontier
in each match, which may take any form between fully transferable and strictly non-
transferable utility. Surplus in a match may not be monotone and transferability may
vary between different attribute pairs, allowing for substantial heterogeneity in prefer-
ences over possible matches.3 The results follow from deriving the graph structure of
the payoff externalities of a change in investments and using the structural properties
of an equilibrium match of attributes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model framework and
provides an example. The main result is in Sect. 3, complemented by an application
to matching markets yielding full segregation. Section 4 concludes and the appendix
contains proofs and details omitted in the text.
2 A model of matching and investments
An economy is populated by a continuum of agents I endowed with measure one.
Agents are characterized by a type θ ∈  where  denotes a finite set of types.
Before the match agents spend effort ei at a cost c(ei , θ). The cost function is strictly
increasing, strictly convex, and differentiable in ei and satisfies the Inada conditions.
An individual’s attribute a ∈ A is stochastic and depends on effort: exerting effort ei
yields probability p(a, ei ) of attaining attribute a. Attribute draws are independent
across individuals. Suppose the set of attributes is finite. Probabilities add up to one,
i.e.,
∑
a∈A p(a, ei ) = 1 and are differentiable in ei . Suppose the attribute distribution
has full support by assuming that p(a, ei ) ∈ (0, 1) for all a∈ A and all ei .4
Matching market
Once attributes have realized, agents match into pairs. Unmatched agents obtain zero
payoff, and a matched pair of agents (i, j) jointly generates surplus, leaving each
partner with a real valued payoff from the match of ui and u j . Joint surplus may
depend on its distribution among partners (for instance due to moral hazard problems
in the match, limited liability, or behavioral concerns), so that individual payoffs ui
and u j satisfy
ui ≤ φ(ai , a j , u j ) with u j + φ(ai , a j , u j ) ≤ y(ai , a j ),
where y(ai , a j ) denotes the maximum surplus in match (ai , a j ), which is assumed
to be finite. φ(ai , a j , u j ) is the Pareto or utility possibility frontier in a match (i, j),
giving i’s maximum payoff when j receives u j , given attributes ai and a j (the notation
follows Legros and Newman 2007). Suppose φ(ai , a j , u j ) is continuous and weakly
decreases in u j with φ(ai , a j , 0) > 0 and φ(ai , a j , u) = 0 implies u > 0 for all
ai , a j ∈ A. Since transferability may depend on the match of attributes (a, a′) some
3 See also Dizdar (2015) for a recent extension of the framework in Cole et al. (2001b) to multidimensional
types and allowing for payoffs that are not supermodular.
4 This reduces the problem of multiple equilibria due to coordination failure as noted by Bhaskar and
Hopkins (2014) and has been used e.g. in Gall et al. (2009).
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combinations may allow for full transferability, while others may not. This may be
a source of gains from trades, as more transferability with some partner than with
another may compensate for lower maximal joint surplus.
To see that φ(.) captures the degree of payoff transferability in a match, note that
full transferability of utility corresponds to
φ(a, a′, u) = y(a, a′) − u, for 0 ≤ u ≤ y(a, a′),
which ensures that for every distribution of surplus in the match (ui , u j ) the joint
surplus ismaximized, i.e.,ui+u j = y(ai , a j ).At the other extreme is strictly nontrans-
ferable utility, e.g., if joint surplus has to be shared at a fixed ratio, say δ ∈ [1/2, 1]with
φ(a, a′, u j ) = δy(a, a′) for u j ≤ (1− δ)y(a, a′), and φ(a, a′, u j ) = (1− δ)y(a, a′)
for (1− δ)y(a, a′) < u j ≤ δy(a, a′). The ratio could depend on the match, of course.
In most relevant applications surplus will monotonically increase as own effort
investment cost increases, assume therefore
Assumption 1 (Investment Technology). Suppose that







(ii) p(a,ei )∈(0,1) is an affine, strictly monotone function of ei for all a∈ A.
Part (i) means that for any given attribute a the expected maximal joint surplus in a
match increases in effort, which imposes some order on the attribute space, though
attributes may well be multidimensional. Part (ii) ensures that first order conditions
will pin down investments given a matching assignment (see “Appendix” for a gener-
alization).
Timing
Events unfold as follows.
1. Nature draws cost types θ .
2. Agents spend effort ei .
3. Attributes ai realize.
4. Agents match into pairs in a frictionless market, agreeing on feasible payoffs ui
and u j .
Equilibrium concept
Denote the measure of attribute realization a given investments e = (ei )i∈I in the
matching market by q(a, e). The matching in pairs results in measures ρ(a, a′) of
matched pairs of unordered attributes (a, a′) ∈ A × A. For all attributes a any match
is preferable to the singleton payoff 0. Therefore all agents match into pairs and
feasibility of the match requires
q(a, e) = 2ρ(a, a) +
∑
a′ =a∈A
ρ(a, a′) for a ∈ A. (2)
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An equilibrium match ρ pins down the attribute assignment μ that maps A into its
power set, defined by μ(a) = {a′ ∈ A : ρ(a, a′) > 0} for all a ∈ A.
The solution concept for the matching market based on attributes is a stable match
with side payments subject to nontransferabilities captured by the utility possibility
frontiers. This is best interpreted as a competitivemarket for attributes, yieldingmarket
prices for attributes. Market payoffs and the matching pattern will depend on attribute
measures q(a, e). An equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Matching market equilibrium) A matching market equilibrium (u∗, ρ)
are payoffs u∗ : I → R and a matching of agents into pairs, such that measures
ρ = (ρ(a, a′))a,a′∈A×A satisfy feasibility (2), and for all matched agents i, j ∈ I
payoffs are feasible, i.e., ui ≤ φ(ai , a j , u j ), and there are no agents i and j with
attributes ai and a j and payoffs ui , u j such that ui ≤ φ(ai , a j , u j ) and both ui > u∗i
and u j > u∗j .
Existence of a stable match and thus of a matching market equilibrium follows from
Kaneko and Wooders (1986), as feasibility implies measures are preserved, the set of
attributes A is finite, and per capita surplus is finite by assumption.
Note that rationing may be required when two agents with the same attribute obtain
different equilibrium payoffs. Assume that agents with attribute a are assigned ran-
domly with probabilities implied by the relative frequencies of matches (a, a′) for
all a′ ∈ μ(a): an agent with attribute a is assigned to an agent with attribute a′ with
probability ρ(a, a′)/q(a, e) if a = a′ and 2ρ(a, a′)/q(a, e) otherwise. This uniform
rationing implies that all agents of the same attribute a have the same expected payoff
in a match (a, a′). Denote this expected payoff by Eu∗a(a, a′). Defining an attribute’s
expected payoff by





[Eu∗a(a, a′) − Eu∗a(a, a)], (3)




p(a, ei )v(a) − c(ei , θi ).
Individual effort is chosen before the market to maximize expected payoff anticipating
matching market equilibrium payoffs. An equilibrium of the investment and matching
problem is thus a profile of effort investments and amatchingmarket equilibrium, such
that investments are individually optimal given equilibrium payoffs resulting from the
attribute distribution generated by the investments.
Definition 2 (Investment cum matching equilibrium) An investment cum matching
equilibrium are investments e∗ = (e∗i )i∈I and a matching market equilibrium (u∗, ρ)
given the measures of attributes q(a, e∗) induced by e∗, such that no individual i ∈ I
can obtain strictly higher expected payoff given the matching equilibrium (u∗, ρ)
choosing investment e′i = e∗i .
123
Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments in matching… 57
The investment stage is an anonymous game, for which equilibrium existence has been
established, for instance, byMas-Colell (1984).Note that the investment cummatching
equilibria relies on rational expectations of the matching equilibrium payoffs given
aggregate investments. Therefore there may be multiple investment cum matching
equilibria. Whether a matching equilibriummaximizes total surplus given the realized
attributes depends on the properties of φ(a, a′), see e.g. Legros and Newman (2007).
Since all agents with the same type face the same optimization problem before the
market, and thus choose the same effort level eθ , partitioning the agent space I into
intervals I (θ) such that θi = θ for all i ∈ I (θ) for all θ ∈ , will ensure that all
i ∈ I (θ) will face the same distribution p(a, eθ ). Then for each I (θ) the frequency
of each a converges to the expected frequency given p(a, eθ ).5 Therefore the realized






Two different benchmarks can be used to evaluate efficiency of amatching cum invest-
ment equilibrium depending on whether a social planner is able to choose effort
investment levels and the payoff distribution within matches, or is constrained to
set investments, unable to affect nontransferabilities.
Surplus optimal allocation
Suppose first a social planner can choose investment levels and the surplus sharing to
ensure ui + u j = y(ai , a j ) in all matches (i, j), i.e., the surplus is ex post efficient















c(ei , θi )di, (4)
such that ρ results as a matching market equilibrium assignment given e. The opti-
mization is over investments e of a continuum of individuals, but since the investment
cost is strictly convex and all individuals i of the same type θ have the same expected
profits, they will have the same investment eθ in optimum. With a finite type space the
optimization is really only over a finite vector of investments.
Constrained surplus optimal allocation
If one is interested in surplus maximizing investments constrained on taking joint
surplus in each match as given by the equilibrium payoffs, it suffices to substi-
tute maximal surplus y(a, a′) with equilibrium surplus yˆ(ai , a j ) = u∗i + u∗j for all
ai ∈ μ(a j ) in the optimization problem (4):
5 To see this one may follow, e.g., the approach in Uhlig (1996) using indicator random variables Ia=aˆ

















c(ei , θi )di, (5)
such that ρ results as a matching market equilibrium assignment given e. This formu-
lation takes into account the non-transferabilities present at the matching equilibrium
allocation, since u∗i = yˆ(ai , a j )−φ(ai , a j , u∗j ) for an equilibrium match a j ∈ μ(ai ).
2.2 Example: heterogeneous matches
To illustrate the result in the simplest way possible consider the following example
with a binary attribute space A = {a0, a1}. Agents are homogeneous and share the cost
function c(ei , θi ) = e2i /2. Let ei ∈ (0, 1) and p(a1, ei ) = ei and p(a0, ei ) = 1 − ei .
Suppose that maximal joint surplus is
y(a0, a0) = 0 < y(a0, a1) = 4/3 < y(a1, a1) = 2,
implying condition (1). Nontransferabilities are severe in that payoff has to be split
equally in homogeneous matches, so that ui = y(a, a)/2 in a match (i, j) with
ai = a j = a. In a heterogenous match surplus y(a0, a1) can be split equally, or
according to a sharing rule: ui = δ0y(a0, a1) if ai = a0 and ui = δ1y(a0, a1) if
ai = a1. Suppose for now that δ0 + δ1 = 1. This means that payoffs are ex post
efficient, i.e., ui + u j = y(ai , a j ) for all matches (ai , a j ).
Matching market outcome
Starting with the matching market equilibrium outcome, suppose that
y(a0, a0)/2 ≤ δ0y(a0, a1) and δ1y(a0, a1) ≥ y(a1, a1)/2. (GDD)
Condition (GDD) implies that a heterogeneous match (a0, a1) is weakly preferred
by both partners to their respective payoff in a homogeneous match. Hence, negative
assortative matching will be an equilibrium (the only one when the inequalities are
strict), exhausting all possible (a0, a1) matches (i.e., a0 ∈ μ(a1) and a1 ∈ μ(a0)) and
matching the remaining agents in homogeneous matches. Figure 1 shows the possible
assignments.
Which regime will occur depends on parameters through the investment incentives.
Recall that v(a) denotes the expected market equilibrium payoff for an attribute a. An
agent i chooses effort ei to solve maxei p(a1, ei )[v(a1)− v(a0)] + v(a0)− e2i /2. The
optimal effort choice e∗i satisfies
e∗i = v(a1) − v(a0). (6)
a0 a1 a0 a1 a0 a1
Fig. 1 Possible assignments in the example: attributes have the samemeasure (left), a1 are scarce (middle),
or a0 are scarce (right)
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Equilibrium payoffs v(a) depend on relative scarcity: if q(a1, e∗) > 1/2 then both
(a1, a1) and (a0, a1) matches will occur and










If, on the other hand, q(a1, e∗) < 1/2, then










Finally, q(a1, e∗) = 1/2 iff (δ1 − δ0)y(a0, a1) = 1/2. That is, investment incen-
tives v(a1) − v(a0) strictly decrease in q(a1, e∗) and thus in investments. Hence, the
matching cum investment equilibrium is unique.
To ease exposition focus on one case, say q(a1, e∗) > 1/2, corresponding to the
right graph in Fig. 1. Setting δ1 = 4/5 will ensure that (δ1 − δ0)y(a0, a1) > 1/2
and thus q(a1, e∗) > 1/2. This yields equilibrium payoffs and effort: v(a0) =
δ0y(a0, a1) = 4/15 and e∗ = (1 + √8/5)/3 ≈ 3/4.
Surplus optimal outcome
The parametrization ensures that
y(a0, a0) + y(a1, a1) < 2y(a0, a1), (DD)
so that μ(a0) = a1 and μ(a1) = {a0; a1} maximize total surplus given attributes if
q(a1, e) > q(a0, e). Surplus optimal investments solving (4) satisfy
ei = y(a1, a1) − y(a0, a1). (7)
That is, marginal cost equals the expected marginal benefit of investment, which is
given by turning an (a0, a1) match into an (a1, a1) match. This implies q(a1, e) =
2/3 > 1/2 in our setup, which is the unique optimum as y(a1, a1) − y(a0, a1) <
y(a0, a1) − y(a0, a0) by assumption.
Comparing equilibrium and surplus optimal investments yields



















That is, there is overinvestment in the investment cummatching equilibrium compared
to the surplus optimal outcome. Given the investment cum matching equilibrium out-
come, decreasing investments (for instance through taxation)will increase total surplus




This occurs despite the fact that payoffs are ex post efficient, i.e., ui+u j = y(ai , a j )
in all matches. However, the market equilibrium remunerates attribute a1 ”too well”
in (a0, a1) matches: its payoff is strictly greater than its opportunity cost y(a1, a1)/2.
Equal treatment
The inefficiency above stems from a failure of equal treatment of equal attributes:
a1’s equilibrium payoff is greater in (a0, a1) than in (a1, a1) matches: δ1y(a0, a1) >
y(a1, a1)/2. To see this suppose now:
δ1y(a0, a1) = y(a1, a1)/2. (8)
Negative assortative matching remains an equilibrium as (GDD) still holds.6 Suppose
that payoffs are still ex post efficient (δ0 = 1 − δ1), so that v(a1) = y(a1, a1)/2 and
v(a0) = y(a0, a1) − y(a1, a1)/2, and
e∗i = y(a1, a1) − y(a0, a1). (9)
Hence, when all agents with attribute a1 obtain the same payoff for q(a1, e∗) ≥ 1/2
(which holds as argued above) investments are surplus efficient.
Suppose now that (8) still holds, but payoffs are not ex post efficient, i.e., δ0 < 1−δ1,
say δ0 = 1/8. If q(a1, e∗) ≥ 1/2, v(a1) = y(a1, a1)/2 and v(a0) = δ0y(a0, a1),
yielding
e∗i = y(a1, a1)/2 − δ0y(a0, a1) > y(a1, a1) − y(a0, a1). (10)
In this parametrization indeed q(a1, e∗) = 5/6 ≥ 1/2. That is, investment incentives
are not surplus optimal as equilibrium payoffs are not ex post efficient. Accessing the
surplus optimal outcome would require to force (a0, a1) matches to split the surplus,
however, compromising stability of the match.
Ex post inefficient payoffs and constrained efficiency
Often the social planner is limited to adjusting investment and cannot affect the sur-
plus sharing among matching partners. The constrained surplus optimal allocation
accounts for this, and takes the joint surplus in the matching equilibrium as given, i.e.,
yˆ(a0, a1) = (δ0 + δ1)y(a0, a1), and yˆ(a, a) = y(a, a) for a = a0, a1. With δ0 = 1/8
and δ1 = 3/4, yˆ(a1, a1)+ yˆ(a0, a0) < 2 yˆ(a0, a1), so that negative assortative match-
ing still maximizes total surplus. For μ(a1) = {a0; a1}, both equilibrium and surplus
optimal investments satisfy
ei = yˆ(a1, a1) − yˆ(a1, a0) = y(a1, a1) − δ1y(a0, a1) − δ0y(a0, a1) = e∗i . (11)
That is, with equal treatment the matching cum investment equilibrium outcome coin-
cides with the constrained surplus optimal outcome.
These results extend to other parametrizations, which may give rise to the remain-
ing assignments shown in Fig. 1. The marginal surplus from investing depends on
6 It is the only one if utility is transferable at a bounded, strictly positive rate in the neighborhood of
y(a1, a1)/2, e.g., if in each match δ1 can be chosen from an interval [3/4 − , 3/4 + ] for small  > 0.
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the changes of the frequencies of different matches. If q(a0, e∗) > q(a1, e∗), more
investment transforms an (a0, a0) into an (a0, a1) match, so that investments are sur-
plus optimal if
ei = y(a0, a1) − y(a0, a0).
If q(a0, e∗) = q(a1, e∗) (on the left in Fig. 1) a change in investments will change the
attribute assignment μ, adding new attribute matches, namely (a1, a1) if e increases,
and (a0, a0) if e decreases. Hence, if q(a0, e∗) = q(a1, e∗)market equilibrium invest-
ments are surplus optimal if
e∗i ∈ [y(a1, a1) − y(a0, a1), y(a0, a1) − y(a0, a0)], (12)
which is ensured if market payoffs are ex post efficient and satisfy equal treatment in
all three allocations depicted in Fig. 1.
That is, conditions for optimality depend on the particular properties of the attribute
assignment μ, and in particular on whether the assignment will change discretely in
response to a marginal change in investment. Interpreting the attribute assignment as
a graph will be useful to establish a more general result in the next section. For now
it is easily checked that the efficiency result above carries over to the cases other than
q(a0, e∗) < q(a1, e∗). This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Simple example)Suppose that conditions (GDD)and (DD)hold. Then
under equal treatment, i.e. condition (8), a matching cum investment equilibrium is
constrained surplus optimal, and surplus optimal if equilibrium payoffs are ex post
efficient.
That is, conditional on the match (under the assumption market equilibrium and
surplus optimal match coincide), a social planner cannot change investments alone
to increase aggregate surplus when equilibrium payoffs satisfy an equal treatment
property. Equal treatment of attributes in all equilibrium matches ensures that each
attribute is paid its marginal contribution to social surplus, possibly constrained by
utility nontransferabilities. Otherwise, remuneration differs across matches and in
somematch an attribute is either under- or overpaid. If additionally equilibriumpayoffs
are ex post efficient then investments are surplus optimal.
3 General case
The result illustrated above generalizes beyond the simple example. Return therefore
to the more general environment laid out in Sect. 2.
3.1 Equal treatment
The efficiency result above hinges on equal treatment of equal attributes. Define the
equal treatment property accordingly as follows.
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Definition 3 A matching market equilibrium satisfies the equal treatment property,
if individual payoffs u∗i depend only on attributes, and for all a ∈ A, u∗a(a, a′) =
u∗a(a, a′′) for all a′, a′′ ∈ μ(a), or, in terms of utility possibility frontiers:
v(a) = φ(a, a′, v(a′)) for all a, a′ ∈ A with ρ(a, a′) > 0. (ET)
This is precisely condition (8) above. It is rather undesirable to state an efficiency
result relying on a property of equilibrium payoffs. The following proposition relates
the equal treatment property to the primitives in form of the degree of utility transfer-
ability, details are in the “Appendix”.
Proposition 2 (Equal treatment property) The equal treatment property holds in a
matching market equilibrium (u∗, ρ) if φ(a, a′, u) is differentiable in u and for all





Condition (MTU) states that for any match (a, a′) and given some feasible sharing
of surplus, marginally increasing the payoff of one agent marginally decreases the
payoff of the other one, independently of whether this decreases or increases joint
surplus. This property holds if partners in a match can exchange utility at a bounded,
positive rate for every feasible division of surplus. That is, if utility is marginally
transferable for every feasible surplus sharing, a matching market equilibrium will
have the equal treatment property.
3.2 Main result
Thus equipped it is possible to state the main result.
Theorem 1 (Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments) Let Condition (MTU) hold.
Then there is an investment cum matching equilibrium such that equilibrium invest-
ments are constrained surplus efficient, so that a social planner cannot increase
aggregate surplus by changing only investments.
To prove this result start by establishing that under equal treatment ex post effi-
ciency of payoffs implies surplus efficiency. This then implies that an equilibrium
is constrained surplus efficient, i.e., surplus efficient if payoffs are constrained by
nontransferabilities to the payoffs reached in equilibrium. For (constrained) surplus
efficiency note first that it is sufficient to show that the necessary conditions of the
investment cummatching equilibrium coincide with the necessary conditions of a sur-
plus efficient allocation. This is because any surplus efficient allocation that satisfies
the necessary conditions of the investment cum matching equilibrium is in fact an
investment cum matching equilibrium allocation.
Start by characterizing the matching cum investment equilibrium. An individual i
of type θi chooses effort ei to solve maxei
∑
a∈A p(a, ei )v(a)− c(ei , θi ). The optimal
effort choice e∗i satisfies
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i , θi )
∂ei
. (13)
This pins down for each type θ a unique individually optimal investment e∗θ (v(a))
for equilibrium payoffs v(a) given by (3) and determined by the matching equilib-
rium given e∗. That is, an investment cum matching equilibrium need not be unique,
explaining the qualifier in the theorem.
The next step is to show the necessary conditions (13) are consistent with the nec-
essary conditions with respect to marginal deviations of investment in a (constrained)
surplus efficient allocation. This is in fact sufficient to prove the theorem, because if
the necessary conditions of the investment cum matching equilibrium allocation and
the (constrained) surplus efficient allocation coincide, then the (constrained) surplus
efficient allocation must be an investment cum matching equilibrium. This is because
the necessary conditions (13) determine investments e given the equilibrium attribute
assignment μ and, if they are satisfied in a (constrained) surplus efficient allocation,
equilibrium investments e and the associated matching allocation with assignment μ
will also be a (constrained) surplus efficient allocation. Hence, a (constrained) surplus
efficient allocation that satisfies conditions (13) will be an investment cum matching
equilibrium.
Therefore it is in order to focus on marginal deviations of effort investment, i.e.,
to examine deviations conditional on the match. Here another complication arises, as
even a marginal change of investments may produce a discrete change of the associ-
ated equilibrium attribute assignment μ. Hence, a marginal investment change may
potentially yield a discrete change of marginal benefits. If μ remains unchanged on
the other hand, measures ρ(a, a′) given in (2) are differentiable with respect to q(a, e)
and thus with respect to eθ , and a first order condition approach can be used. This is
guaranteed when the attribute assignment μ satisfies a property that is inspired by
graph theory: the graph generated by μ has at least one cycle.
The matching market equilibrium as a graph
The set of attributes A and the assignment μ define an undirected graph G with a
set of vertices A and a set of edges E = {(a, a′) : a′ ∈ μ(a)}, denoting attribute
matches. Let C denote the set of connected components in G. For instance, if all
matches are homogeneous (i.e., a0 only match with a0 and a1 with a1) in equilibrium
(full segregation), then ρ(a, a′) > 0 iff a = a′, so thatμ(a) = a for all a ∈ A. Hence,
each vertex a ∈ A has only one edge, (a, a) and is a connected component, so that
the set of components is C = A.
What follows focuses on matching market equilibria such that each connected
component c ∈ C has at most as many edges as vertices. An equilibrium with this
property always exists, and the surplus maximizing one for given attributes has this
property. It necessarily holds if the equilibrium is unique. See “Appendix” for details
on this and the next statements. Denote the sets of vertices and edges in c by Ac and
Ec to state the following fact.
Fact 1 In a graph G associated to an equilibrium assignmentμ such that |Ec| ≤ |Ac|
for each connected component c, in each connected component either
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(i) c contains exactly one cycle of length n ≥ 0 of n + 1 vertices {a0; . . . ; an} and
edges (an, a0) and (ai , ai+1) for i = 1, . . . , n − 1, or
(ii) a /∈ μ(a) for all a ∈ Ac and |Ac| > |Ec|, then c does not contain a cycle.
That is, for each component either |Ac| = |Ec| and c contains a cycle or an edge (a, a)
(which is a cycle of length 0), or |Ac| > |Ec| and c has at least two terminal vertices.
For instance, the left assignment in Fig. 1 corresponds to case (ii), whereas the other
two assignments have cycles (of length 0, linking an attribute to itself) and thus fall
into case (i).
Whether an equilibrium assignment μ contains a cycle can be tied to whether it
responds to a marginal change in investments e. Recall that measures ρ(.) satisfy the
system of equations (2). If |A| > |E |, then G has a component c with |Ac| > |Ec|.




ρ(a, a′) for a ∈ Ac.






q(a, e) = 0,
where d(a, a0) indicates the distance (minimal path length) between a and a0, and
n = maxa∈Ac d(a, a0). Therefore a marginal change of a type θ ’s investments eθ ,
changing measures q(a, e), violates the condition, unless the changes of the measures








= 0 for all c ∈ G with |Ac| > |Ec|. (14)
That is, unless condition (14) holds, the assignment μ must change (adding new
matches or removing old ones) in response to an investment change. If all components
contain as many edges as vertices, they contain a cycle, corresponding to case (i)
of Fact 1, so that any marginal change in measures q(a, e(θ)) is accommodated by
adjusting measures of attribute pairs in the cycle, without needing to adjust the graph.
This yields the following fact.
Fact 2 If, and only if, in the graph G associated to an equilibrium assignment μ the
number of vertices strictly exceeds the number of edges, |A| > |E |, then a marginal
change in investment e implies that μ is no longer an equilibrium assignment, unless
condition (14) holds.
The following definition characterizes equilibrium assignments μ that do not change
in response to a marginal change in investments.
Definition 4 (Static assignment) An equilibrium assignment μ is static if the number
of edges in the graph G induced by μ at least equals the number of vertices.
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Static case
Suppose first thatμ(a) indeed satisfies Definition 4. In this case investments that solve




















Since the first derivative of expected surplus (1) decreases in investment e(θ), as p(.) is
concave and c(.) strictly convex in eθ , (15) is a sufficient and necessary condition for
a solution of the social planner’s problem (4) conditional on μ. The LHS of (15) can
be decomposed into the set of disjoint connected components C , since by definition






















That is, the marginal cost of investment must equal its expected marginal return.
An increase in investment will increase the measure of some matches and decrease
the one of others. The marginal return of investment is then given by the difference
in joint surplus in the matches whose measures increase and those whose measures
decrease. These marginal matches will depend on the entire graph defined by the
attribute assignment. In the example above more investment simply transformed some
(a0, a1) into (a1, a1)matches, but in general the change of measures needs to be traced
through each component. Doing this for an assignment μ and comparing equilibrium
investments to the social planner’s solution yields the following proposition, its proof
can be found in the “Appendix”.
Proposition 3 Suppose an equilibrium assignmentμ is static and the equal treatment
property holds for equilibrium payoffs u∗. Then, given μ, investments e∗ are surplus
efficient for any p(a, ei ) satisfying (1) if, and only if, equilibrium payoffs u∗ maximize
joint surplus in each match.
This implies, of course, that investments e∗ are constrained surplus efficient, when
the social planner is constrained to payoffs yˆ(a, a′) = v(a) + v(a′). That is, if equal
treatment holds, then a social planner who cannot alter the sharing of surplus nor the
match cannot increase aggregate surplus by changing investments, and investment are
constrained surplus efficient.
Non-static case
Focus now on equilibrium assignments μ that are not static and contain a component
c satisfying case (ii) of Fact 1. That is, a marginal change of investment triggers a
change in the equilibrium assignment of attributes μ, since there is no cycle in c to
adjust to balance any excess or shortfall of attributes. This change in assignment may
correspond to a jump in in the marginal benefits from investment, as they depend on
the precise graph of μ. Hence, for efficiency of a particular investment profile e∗ that
123
66 T. Gall
is compatible with a non-static graph, the social marginal cost of investing needs to
lie between the different social marginal returns resulting from a discrete change in
assignment due to either increasing or decreasing investment, as in condition (12) in
the simple example above.
Therefore, the necessary condition (15) for the static case need not hold. Instead
investments are characterized by lower and upper bounds that depend on the change
in assignment μ that is triggered by a change in investment of some type θ . For each
type θ denote byμθ (μθ ) the equilibrium assignment and measures ρθ (ρθ ) that arises
if all agents of type θ increase (decrease) their investment ei . The counterpart of the













































That is, the marginal cost of effort for all types needs to be between the return of mar-
ginally increasing and marginally decreasing investment for each type. The following
proposition states that for surplus efficiency the upper and lower bounds have to reflect
the true marginal returns, which under equal treatment is assured by ex post efficiency.
Proposition 4 Suppose an equilibrium assignment μ is not static. If the equal treat-
ment property holds for payoffs for all equilibrium assignments μ
θ
and μθ , then
equilibrium investments are surplus efficient if u∗i + u∗j = y(ai , a j ) for equilibrium
payoffs associated to assignments μ, μ
θ
and μθ for θ ∈ .
Hence, as long as equal treatment holds, conditional on the assignmentμ (including
the one that is surplus efficient) the only distortion of investments stems from ex post
inefficiency of equilibrium payoffs. This in turn implies that there is an investment
cum matching equilibrium such that a social planner who cannot alter the surplus
sharing within matches cannot increase aggregate surplus by changing investments.
3.3 Application: full segregation
A particular class of static equilibrium assignments are those characterized by full
segregation (only matches of the type (a, a)). Suppose that surplus y(a, a′) in each
match has to be split equally. Imposing some order on A, min{y(a, a); y(a′, a′)} <
y(a, a′) < max{y(a, a); y(a′, a′)} for all a, a′ ∈ A, implies that equilibriummatching
takes the form of full segregation: μ(a) = a for all a ∈ A for any distribution of
attributes, as all agents have the same preference ranking over attributes to match
with and less attractive attributes cannot outbid more attractive attributes (see e.g.
Legros and Newman 2010). Hence, the graph induced by the equilibrium is static with
components C = A for any investment e.
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The investment cummatching equilibriumsatisfies equal treatment, asφ(a, a, v(a))
= y(a, a)/2 = v(a) for all a ∈ A by assumption (surplus has to be split equally).
Since also u∗i + u∗j = y(ai , a j ) by definition, the Theorem above implies that the
investment cum matching equilibrium is surplus efficient. For more general payoffs
that imply an equilibrium assignment with full segregation the Theorem implies the
following useful corollary.
Corollary 1 (Full segregation) Suppose that an investment cummatching equilibrium
necessarily induces an assignment μ(a) = a for all a ∈ A. The investment cum
matching equilibrium is surplus efficient if, and only if payoffs are ex post efficient,
i.e., if φ(a, a, y(a, a)/2) = y(a, a)/2 for all a ∈ A. The investment cum matching
equilibrium is constrained surplus efficient if condition (MTU) holds.
Surplus efficiency follows from the assumption that equal division maximises joint
surplus in each match as this implies both equal treatment and ex post efficiency
of payoffs. The condition that equal division of the payoff is ex post efficient in a
match of agents with equal attributes seems likely to be satisfied in most, if not all,
relevant applications. A counterexample in the “Appendix” demonstrates that it may
fail, although rather extreme assumptions are needed.
4 Discussion and conclusion
This paper has examined competition in large matching markets where participants
have an opportunity to invest in their attributes relevant for matching payoffs before
entering the matching market. The main result is positive: if payoffs satisfy a rela-
tively mild property, namely that matching surplus is marginally transferable at any
strictly positive rate between matching partners, an investment cum matching equi-
librium allocation will be constrained efficient, in the sense that a social planner who
cannot alter the payoff distribution within matches cannot increase aggregate surplus
by altering investment alone. A limitation of the result is that there may be multiple
equilibria due to rational expectation, meaning there is still scope for coordination
failure (explored e.g. by Bhaskar and Hopkins 2014, in a two-sided framework).
The result is quite relevant from a policy perspective: not only does it suggest that
taxing or subsidising investments will have limited effect on aggregate surplus, but
also, and perhapsmore importantly, the result has an interesting implication for the use
of matching rules as a policy tool, for instance in form of affirmative action (as in Gall
et al. 2009) or team formation. Given a modicum of transferability such policies will
therefore yield constrained surplus efficient investments conditional on the matching
that is imposed and given the payoffs in the matching stage.
Technically, transferability ofmatching surplus at a strictly positive rate implies that
an equal treatment property holds in the matching equilibrium, which then ensures
that ex post efficiency of payoffs ensures surplus efficiency, i.e., the only distortion of
investment incentives stems from the nontransferabilities. This implies an interesting
corollary when full segregation is necessarily the matching outcome: if equal sharing
of surplus maximizes joint surplus in each match then an investment cum matching
equilibrium resulting in full segregation is surplus efficient.
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Appendix: Mathematical appendix
Relaxing assumption 1
Assumption (1) can be replaced by a more general investment technology. Suppose
that every individual i chooses a portfolio of effort levels eai ≥ 0 with a ∈ A.
The probability pa(eai ) of attaining attribute a is differentiable, strictly concave and
increases in eai . Let the cost c(ei , θi ) depend on an aggregate of portfolio invest-






decreases, e.g., f (.) is the identity function.
In an investment cum matching equilibrium an individual chooses the opti-
mal portfolio of effort, constrained by aggregate individual investment ei . Since∑
a∈A pa(eai ) = 1 there is a0 with pa0(ea0i ) = 1 −
∑
a a0∈A pa(eai ). Denote by
a0 the attribute that has least expected payoff v(a0). Then the optimal portfolio of














[v(a) − v(a0)] = ∂pa′ (ea′i )∂eai [v(a′) − v(a0)] and the resource constraint
determines the unique optimal effort portfolio (e∗ai (ei )). Note that all e∗ai (ei ), a =
a0 ∈ A, increase in ei . This also defines the probabilities p(a, ei ) = pai (e∗ai (ei )) for
all a ∈ A. Applying the envelope theorem, optimal aggregate individual investment








= ∂c(ei , θi )
∂ei
for any a = a0 ∈ A.
Hence, the first order condition pins down a unique effort portfolio for each individual
given the anticipated matching payoffs v(a).
An analogous argument holds for maximizing (constrained) total surplus. Surplus





ρ(a, a)y(a, a) +
∑
a′ =a∈A
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Again the envelope theorem ensures that optimal aggregate investment eθ of individ-
uals with type θ is given by
∂ρ(a,a)
∂eaθ














for attributes with eaθ > 0. Since
∂ρ(a,a′)
∂eaθ
is zero or ± ∂pa(eaθ )
∂eaθ
, concavity of pa(eaθ )
ensures a unique solution eθ .
To see that this technology nests affine functions p(a, ei ), assume that, e.g.,
pa(eai ) = √eai , restrict the domain of eai appropriately, and f (.) = √(.). Then
p(a, ei ) is a linear function of ei .
Edges and vertices
A necessary condition for a unique matching equilibrium μ(.) is that |Ec| ≤ |Ac|.




ρ(a, a′) + 2ρ(a, a) for a ∈ Ac (17)
has a solution ρ1 such that ρ1(a, a′) = 0 for some a, a′ ∈ Ac. Since all matches
defined by μ cannot be blocked by other matches as μ is a matching equilibrium, the
assignment defined by ρ1 must also be a matching equilibrium, with μ1 = μ. Hence,
|Ec| ≤ |Ac| is a necessary condition for uniqueness of μ.
Suppose amatching equilibriumμ such that |Ec| > |Ac|. Then themaximal surplus
satisfying (17) can be achieved by a choice of ρ with ρ(a, a′) = 0 for some a, a′ ∈ Ac.
Otherwise ρ can still be changed such that surplus weakly increases, since if there is
a change of ρ that strictly decreases total surplus there must an opposite change that
increases total surplus.
Finally, suppose that a matching equilibrium satisfies the equal treatment property
and has |Ec| > |Ac|. Then choosing ρ such that ρ(a, a′) = 0 for some a, a′ ∈ Ac
will not alter payoffs since by the equal treatment property all attributes are indifferent
between all their matches.
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Proof of fact 1
This fact re-states well-known results in graph theory. Let c be a connected component
of G induced by an equilibrium assignment μ.
(i) Suppose first c contains some a such that a ∈ μ(a). Suppose that c also contains
a cycle. Then |Ec| > |Ac|, since a cycle has as many edges as vertices. The same argu-
ment can be applied to the case of c containing some a′ = a with a′ ∈ μ(a′). Suppose
now that a /∈ μ(a) for all a ∈ Ac and |Ec| = |Ac|. If there is no cycle in c, then cmust
be a chain, since c is assumed to be a connected component, and the number of vertices
must exceed the number of edges by one. This contradicts the assumption. Therefore
c must contain a cycle. c cannot contain more than one cycle since this would imply
that the number of edges exceed the number of vertices in a connected component.
(ii) Suppose that |Ec| < |Ac|, which implies |Ec| = |Ac| − 1. Then a connected
component c cannot contain a cycle of any length, as a cycle has as many edges as
vertices, but |Ec| < |Ac|. Hence, c is a tree, possibly with many terminal nodes.
Proof of proposition 2
Suppose the condition in the proposition holds, but equal treatment in equilibrium
does not. Then in equilibrium there is an attribute ai with ak, a j ∈ μ(ai ) such that
φ(ai , a j , u∗j ) > φ(ai , ak, u∗k). But then an agent with attribute ai who is matched to
an agent with an attribute ak , and an agent with an attribute a j who is matched to an
agent with attribute ai , find it both strictly profitable to match together if there are
payoffs φ(ai , ak, u∗k) + i with i > 0 for the one with ai and u∗j +  j with  j > 0
for the one with a j , such that
φ(ai , ak, u
∗
k) + i ≤ φ(ai , a j , u∗j +  j ). (18)
Since φ(ai , a j , u∗j ) > φ(ai , ak, u∗k) by assumption, condition (18) is ensured if the
function φ(ai , ak, u) is continuous in u and strictly decreasing with a slope bounded
away from −∞. Noting that φ(a, a′, u) is non-increasing in u by definition, this is
implied by the condition in the proposition.
Proof of proposition 3
It is useful to distinguish between static graphs that have a cycle of length 0 and those
that have a cycle of greater length, requiring slightly more notation.
Cycle of length 0
Suppose a component c contains a ∈ Ac with a ∈ μ(a); denote it by a0. Define the
distance d(a, a′) of two vertices a, a′ ∈ c by the number of edges in the shortest path
connecting them, e.g. d(a, a′) = 1 if a′ ∈ μ(a). Denote the maximum distance from
vertex a0 by n = maxa∈Ac d(a0, a) and the set of vertices with common distance j
from a0 by Acj = {a ∈ Ac : d(a0, a) = j}, see Fig. 2.
The necessary condition (16) can be written as
∑
c∈C σ c = ν(θ) ∂c(eθ ,θ)∂ei , where
ν(θ) denotes the measure of agents with type θ and
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denotes the effect of a change of investments for a type θ on attributes in component
c. It can be derived by summing up the effects on each match (a, a′) in c ordered by
their distance from a0:











a j−1∈Acj−1∩μ(a j )
y(a j−1, a j )





Let a j ∈ Acj and a j−1 ∈ Acj−1. Then ρ(a j−1, a j ) = q(a j , e) if a j is a terminal
vertex (μ(a j ) = a j−1). For a j , j ≥ 1, that are not terminal vertices:
ρ(a j−1, a j ) = q(a j , e) −
∑
a j+1∈μ(a j )∩Acj+1
ρ(a j , a j+1).
Finally, ρ(a0, a0) = q(a0, e)/2−∑a1∈Ac1 ρ(a0, a1)/2. Since there is a chain from any
node to node a0, the predecessor node of a node a j ∈ A j can be defined recursively
by
a−t (a j ) = A j−t ∩ μ(a−(t−1)(a j )), j ≥ t > 0, and a−0(a j ) = a j .
For instance, a−t (a j ) = a0 for any a j ∈ At . Denoting by ν(θ) the measure of type θ ,




































Define the “externality” that vertices closer to a0 have on those further apart by
x(a j ) = y(a−1(a j ), a j ) − x(a−1(a j )) for j = 1, . . . , n, (19)
Fig. 2 Example for a
component c with one vertex a0
that links to itself





















y(a−1(a j ),a j ) − x(a−1(a j ))






To verify whether surplus efficient investments coincide with equilibrium invest-










θ , θi )
∂ei
.














y(a−1(a j ), a j ) − x(a−1(a j )) − v(a j )














This is implied by v(a j ) = y(a−1(a j ), a j ) − x(a−1(a j )) for all a j ∈ ACj for
j = 1, . . . , n. Recall that x(a j ) = y(a− j (a j ), a j ) − x(a−1(a j )), which means that
v(a j ) = y(a−1(a j ), a j ) − v(a j−1) for j > 0, and v(a0) = y(a0, a0)/2, (22)
implies (21). Note that (22) characterizes the equilibrium payoffs supporting a stable
match under fully transferable utility: each attribute a j ’s payoff is determined by its
value added to its match a−1(a j ).
Arbitrary cycles
Allow now for cycles that have length greater than 0, repeating the argument above
replacing cycles of length 0 with larger ones. Let now dc(a) denote the distance
of a vertex a ∈ Ac to the cycle, e.g. dc(a) = 0 if, and only if, a is part of the
cycle. Then n = maxa∈Ac dc(a) is the maximum distance from the cycle. Again
Acj = {a ∈ Ac : dc(a) = j} denotes the set of vertices with common distance j from
the cycle. Figure 3 shows an example.
Still each node a j ∈ Acj with j > 0 has exactly one predecessor, denoted by
aa−1(a j ) as above. The effects of a change in investment on attributes in component
c, σ c, can be derived by summing up the effects on each pair (a, a′) in c ordered by
their distance from the cycle:
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y(a−1(a j ), a j )





As above, if a j ∈ Acj is a terminal vertex then ρ(a−1(a j ), a j ) = q(a j , e). Oth-
erwise, ρ(a−1(a j ), a j ) = q(a j , e) − ∑a j+1∈μ(a j )∩Acj+1 ρ(a j , a j+1). Since each
vertex in the cycle has exactly two neighbors, ρ(a0, a′0) + ρ(a0, a′′0 ) = q(a0, e) −∑
a1∈μ(a0)∩Ac1 ρ(a0, a1) for any a0 ∈ Ac0 and a′0, a′′0 ∈ μ(a0) ∩ Ac0. Denote by
n0 = (|Ac0| − 1)/2 the maximum distance between any two vertices in the cycle.
Then the “externality” in the cycle that vertices closer to a0 have on those further away





























y(a−1(a j ), a j ) − x(a−1(a j ))






This expression coincides with (20) if Ac0 = a0, i.e. the cycle has length 0.














y(a−1(a j ), a j ) − x(a−1(a j )) − v(a j )













Fig. 3 Example for a











Note that (25) becomes (21) if the cycle has length 0. Here v(a0) = x(a0) holds if
payoffs v(a0) solve the system of equations
v(a0) = y(a0, a′0) − v(a′0) for all a0, a′0 ∈ Ac0 with a0 ∈ μ(a′0).
Hence, if equilibrium payoffs do not coincide with the matching market equilibrium
payoffs under fully transferable utility, the conditions v(a j ) = y(a−1(a j ), a j ) −
x(a−1(a j )) or v(a0) = x(a0) must fail for some attributes. Unless distortions for
some attribute a j with predecessor ak exactly compensate this, (25) must fail. Even if
for some attributes a j and ak the respective distortions in payoff exactly offset each
other, this is not robust to a small change of ∂p(a,ei )
∂ei
, i.e., a marginal perturbation of
the investment technology.
These arguments are summarized in the following statement.
Fact 3 (Static Assignments). Suppose an equilibrium assignment μ is static. Then,
given μ, equilibrium investments coincide with the ones chosen by a surplus maximiz-











x(a j ) − φ(a−1(a j ), a j , u∗a−1(a j ))















where x(ai ) is defined by (19) and (23).
This condition is satisfied if equilibrium payoffs u∗ coincide with equilibrium pay-
offs when utility is fully transferable (φ(a, a′, u) = y(a, a′) − u).
Suppose now that equal treatment holds, i.e. v(a j ) = φ(a j , ak, u∗k) for all
ak ∈ μ(a j ) for all a j ∈ A. Denote the joint payoff in a match (a, a′) by
yˆ(a, a′) = v(a) + v(a′).
Then v(a j ) = yˆ(a j−1, a j ) − v(a j−1) for a j ∈ Acj and a j−1 ∈ Acj−1 ∩ μ(a j ) for
distances j = 1, . . . , n in component c of the graph G. Moreover, v(a0)with a0 ∈ Ac0
solve
v(a0) = yˆ(a0, a′0) − v(a′0) for all a0, a′0 ∈ Ac0 with a0 ∈ μ(a′0).
Then the condition in Fact 3 is satisfied if y(a, a′) = yˆ(a, a′) for all a, a′ ∈ A such
that a′ ∈ μ(a), i.e., u∗i + u∗j = y(ai , a j ) for all matches (i, j). This means that under
equal treatment a matching cum investment equilibrium is surplus efficient if payoffs
are ex post efficient, independent of the investment technology p(a, ei ). If payoffs are
not ex post efficient the condition in Fact 3 will not be satisfied when allowing for
marginal perturbations of the investment technology.
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Proof of proposition 4
Fix θ and denote by G and G the graphs associated to μ
θ
and μθ , and their set of
connected components by C and C . A marginal change in investment implies that
G and G will both contain a cycle each in some component. The marginal surplus
resulting from an increase (decrease) of investment is then given by
∑
c∈C σ c and∑
c∈C σ c, respectively, with σ c and σ c defined by (24). There is no marginal deviation
from equilibrium investments e∗ that can increase aggregate surplus if, and only if,




























Denote by v(a) and v(a) the equilibrium payoffs in assignmentsμ
θ
andμθ as defined
above. Since μ is a stable assignment, the payoffs v(a) have to satisfy v(a) ≥ v(a)
for all a such that
∂p(a,e∗θ )
∂eθ
> 0 and v(a) ≤ v(a′) for all a′ such that ∂p(a′,e∗θ )
∂eθ
< 0.
That is, attributes that are scarcer under μ than under μ receive weakly higher payoffs
whereas attributes that are more abundant receive weakly lower payoffs. Analogously,
v(a) ≤ v(a) for all a such that ∂p(a,e∗θ )
∂eθ




This implies in particular that in an investment cum matching equilibrium for all




























Hence, using the definitions from above, given a matching equilibrium that is not
























Note that by the arguments above lower and upper bounds coincide, if equilibrium pay-
offs coincidewith thosewhenutility is perfectly transferable.Otherwise the investment
technology has to exactly offset any distortions. Proposition 3 implies that if the equal
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treatment property holds for equilibrium payoffs inmatchesμ andμ surplus efficiency
of equilibrium payoffs implies that both conditions in (28) hold with equality.
Example: moral hazard in partnerships
To illustrate the type of non-transferabilities needed for a counterexample, consider
an application: the partnership problem. Two partners i and j exert effort xi and x j ,
which affect the probability g(xi , x j ) that the partnership succeeds. In case of success
the partnership’s revenue is R(ai , a j ), depending on partners’ attributes, otherwise it
is 0. The success probability is given by
g(xi , x j ) = xαi x1−αj .
Let α ≥ 1/2. Exerting effort xi an agent incurs utility cost x2i /2. Non-transferabilities
arise as partners agree on the revenue share s that goes to i , but cannot use lump sum
transfers, e.g. due to liquidity constraints. Hence,
ui = sxαi x1−αj R(ai , a j ) − x2i /2 and u j = (1 − s)xαi x1−αj R(ai , a j ) − x2j /2.
Individual optimal effort choice pins down effort levels depending on s:
xi (s) = (αs) 1+α2 ((1 − α)(1 − s)) 1−α2 R(ai , a j ) and
x j (s) = (αs) α2 ((1 − α)(1 − s)) 2−α2 R(ai , a j ).
Therefore individual payoffs depend also on s and are given by
ui (s) = s(αs)α((1 − α)(1 − s))1−α(1 − α/2)R(ai , a j )2 and
u j (s) = (1 − s)(αs)α((1 − α)(1 − s))1−α(1 − (1 − α)/2)R(ai , a j )2.
That is, the sharing rule s determines a pair of ui and u j and thus joint surplus in
match (i, j). This can be used to construct the Pareto frontier,
φ(ai , a j , u) = argmax
s
ui (s) s.t. u j (s) ≥ u.
The sharing rule that maximizes joint surplus in a match (i, j), s∗ solves
max
s
(αs)α((1 − α)(1 − s))1−αR(ai , a j )2[(1 + α)/2 + (1/2 − α)s)].
The surplus maximizing sharing rule s∗ is a function of α but not of R(a, a), and
s∗ = 1/2 if and only if α = 1/2. Maximal surplus in match (i, j), y(ai , a j ) =
ui (s∗) + u j (s∗) is




((1 − α)(1 − s∗))1−α[(1 + α)/2 + (1/2 − α)s∗]R(ai , a j )2.
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Fig. 4 Utility possibility frontiers
Denote the sharing rule that allows to share joint surplus equally, such that that
ui (sˆ) = u j (sˆ), by sˆ. Setting ui (sˆ) = u j (sˆ) implies sˆ = (1+ α)/3. Indeed sˆ = 1/2 =
s∗ for α = 1/2. Otherwise s∗ > sˆ since ui (s) + u j (s) strictly increases in s at s = sˆ.
Figure 4 depicts φ(ai , a j , u) for three different matches (a, a), (a, a′), and (a′, a′)
with a > a′. The 45◦ line pins down payoffs for equal sharing and the dashed lines
indicate the surplus maximizing payoff sharing.
Suppose that μ(a) = a in equilibrium (this is implied by, e.g., R(a, a) − R(a, a′)
sufficiently high for all a > a′, see below). To verify that payoffs are not ex post
efficient, compute the difference in y(a, a)/2 = (ui (s∗) + u j (s∗))/2 and ui (sˆ) =
u j (sˆ) = φ(a, a, u∗a):
y(a, a)
2






)α( 1 − sˆ
1 − s∗
)1−α 1 + α + (1 − 2α)sˆ
1 + α + (1 − 2α)s∗ .
Since neither s∗ nor sˆ depend on R(a, a) the difference is a constant fraction of
R(a, a)2. Hence, there is a constant κ(α) > 0 depending only on α > 1/2, such that
for all a ∈ A
y(a, a)/2 − E[φ(a, a, u∗a)] = κ(α)R(a, a)2.
Therefore investments are not surplus efficient unless the investment technology
(∂p(a, ei )/∂ei ) exactly compensates the differences κ(α)R(a, a)2.
Hence, a social plannerwho could enforce a different surplus distribution than equal
sharing could increase aggregate surplus. For instance, set s p = sˆ +  for each match
(i, j). If R(a, a) − R(a, a′) is high enough for all a > a′ full segregation remains
the equilibrium outcome and thus ui (s p) + u j (s p) > ui (sˆ) + u j (sˆ) for all matches
(i, j). This decreases the difference y(a, a)/2 − E[φ(a, a, u∗a)] and increases both
aggregate surplus and investments.
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A sufficient condition to ensure full segregation is that themaximumutility attribute
a can obtain when matching with a′ < a falls short of sharing the surplus in a (a, a)




)1+α (1 − s
1 − sˆ
)1−α 2 − αs






where s = argmaxs ui (s),
s = 4 + 2α + α
2 − √(2 − α)(8 − 6α2 − α3)
6α
.
Note that (29) holds whenever the additional revenue generated by having a high
attribute partner, R(a, a) − R(a, a′), is sufficiently great for all attributes.
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